News Staff
Wednesday, March 25, 2026
Commentary by Bill Bullard, CEO, R-CALF USA In Parts I through III, we talked about how, in just over a generation, the U.S. cattle industry had succumbed to an oligopolistic market structure created by global beef packers with unlimited access to lower-cost and undifferentiated imports. This caused the U.S. cattle industry to contract in terms of the number of cattle producers, number of cattle and number of feedlots, which congregate cattle prior to slaughter. It also caused the distortion of competitive market forces that altered the competitive allocation of the consumers’ beef dollar along the supply chain, severed the historical relationship between cattle prices and beef prices and relegated the cattle industry to being incapable of withstanding even moderate economic shocks. We ended Part III by explaining that the second economic shock – the drought that struck in late 2020 – occurred as the cattle industry was already liquidating due to five years of depressed cattle prices, which occurred even though beef prices were rising. We then explained that the global beef packers were importing record volumes of beef from around the world to supplement the domestic cattle industry’s production shortfall. And though record imports had historically driven domestic cattle prices downward, the supply of domestic cattle was so tight that cattle prices broke free from their restraints and began chasing beef prices skyward.